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ABSTRACT 
Event study has been widely applied to measure the effect of an economic event on the 
stock price of a firm and to test the efficiency of a stock market. In this paper, the 
authors use this method to study the effect of takeover activities that occurred among 
the Listed Property Trusts in the Australian Stock Exchange from 1998 to 2004. This 
research investigates the financial performance by daily stock prices and trading 
volumes, as well as the abnormal share returns throughout the period surrounding the 
announcement date of takeover activities. It concludes that takeover activities have a 
significant effect on Listed Property Trusts. Target firms obtained significant abnormal 
wealth for shareholders of 3.5 per cent mean during the examined period, while 
shareholders of the acquiring trusts did not benefit. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Listed property trusts (LPTs) have been a successful indirect property investment 
vehicle in Australia. In November 2004, the LPT sector had total assets of over $100 
billion, comprising over 1500 institutional-grade properties in diversified and sector-
specific portfolios (Property Investment Research, 2005). The LPTs currently account 
for over $73 billion in market capitalization, representing over 8 per cent of the total 
Australian stock market capitalization and making up 12 per cent of the world’s listed 
real estate assets (Australian Stock Exchange, 2006). They are among the most 
securitized in the world. With an annualized ten year return of 13 per cent (equities 
delivered a 10.5 per cent total return over the same period), the LPTs’ strong 
performance is seen as coinciding with the growing pool of superannuation funds. 
 
The first wave of consolidation began at the end of the 1990s, when the number of trusts 
shrank from 51 in 1992 to 37 in 2000, falling again to 34 in 2001. Some researchers 
 1 
forecast that a new wave of consolidation will occur soon. This occurrence is 
particularly so in Australia where mergers and acquisitions are fast gaining recognitions 
as a popular method of corporate restructuring. Easton (1994) observes that takeover 
activities occurred at the turn of the last century, in the 1920s, the 1960s and most 
recently during the 1980s. With the sustained economic expansion in Australia during 
the last two decades, Bishop, Dodd and Officer (1987) report a growing relationship 
between increases in share prices and the number of takeovers. Newell and Tan (2005) 
observed a relative consolidation in the LPT sector via merger and acquisition activities 
by identifying a significant reduction of the number of LPTs. According to data 
provided by ASX, the overall value of mergers and acquisitions transaction in Australia 
was 51.2 billion in 1998,  increasing by 16.7 per cent by 2005 (ASX, 2005). It seems 
that all these points reinforce the conclusion made by Peirson et al (2000) that takeovers 
are value-increasing transaction and that the market for corporate control is driven 
largely the existence of synergies. 
 
The Australian takeovers legislation aims to ensure that target shareholders have equal 
opportunity to share in takeover premiums, have relevant information made available to 
them, and are given ample time to consider the merits of offers made. For the LPTs 
sector, a trend towards consolidation seems likely. According to studies of other sectors 
in the Australian market, there are significant impacts for shareholders’ wealth. Yet 
there is little research on the LPTs. This paper uses data obtained from ASX official 
website, to analyse the impact on LPT shareholders’ wealth when takeovers occur.  
 
The next section reviews previous studies. The data and methodology are then 
introduced. The empirical results are presented and the conclusions made. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There has been considerable empirical research into takeovers and many studies have 
evaluated the effects of takeovers on shareholders of the acquiring and target 
companies. The empirical evidence on takeovers is substantial, but the results of 
different studies are sometimes conflicting, and interpretations of some aspects of the 
results can be controversial. Nevertheless, after surveying the US evidence, Jensen 
(1988) concludes that takeovers benefit shareholders of target companies, with 
abnormal returns in the US exceeding 30 per cent on average and in the mid-1980s 
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averaging about 50 per cent. For acquiring companies, Jensen (1988) finds that they 
earn about 4 per cent in hostile takeovers, and roughly the same in mergers, although 
these returns seem to have declined from past levels. Jensen (1988) also concludes that 
takeovers do not waste credit or resources instead they generate substantial gains, 
historically 8 per cent of the total value of both companies. Campbell et al (2001) 
documents results consistent with Jensen’s, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for 
Real Estate Investment Trusts or REITs’, the equivalent to LPTs in the US, target firms 
are significantly positive (approximately 3 per cent), yet, inconsistent with Jensen’s, 
CARs for acquirers in public mergers are small and negative in all windows, equalling -
0.6 per cent in the three-days-windows.  
 
Consistent with the other findings, Australian empirical evidence for the proposition 
that target firm shareholders’ enjoy abnormal returns following a takeover 
announcement abound in the literature. Covering the period January 1981 to June 1986 
and reported by the Sydney Stock Exchange’s publications “Current Offers” and 
“Takeover Offers” over the period in question, Casey et al (1987) find that target firms 
earn significant positive abnormal returns, while the abnormal returns to bidders are 
statistically not significant. Later, Bugeja and Walter (1995) document the same 
significant result for returns to targets after investigating ASX-listed firms involved in 
78 full takeover offers over the period January 1981 to December 1989 but negative 
results for bidders, over the period [-60, +1] days relative to the bid announcement date, 
55 bidders who made pure cash offers earned an average CAR of -3.36 per cent, while 
12 bidders who made pure share offers earned 4.67 per cent.  
 
In recent papers, from Australian researchers, Maheswaran, and Pinder (2005) and 
Simmonds (2004), Australian bidders get significant positive return and significant 
increases in wealth at the announcement of takeover offers. 
 
From the previous studies, it can be observed that target firms benefit from takeover 
activities (Jensen, 1988; Campbell, 2001; Casey et al, 1987; Bugeja and Walter, 1995; 
Maheswaran and Pinder, 2005; Simmonds, 2004) at different rates of return. Some 
bidders found negative returns (Campbell, 2001; Bugeja and Walter, 1995), however, 
others found positive (Maheswaran and Pinder, 2005; Simmonds, 2004). This motivated 
the authors to examine the results in the LPTs sector. 
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 METHODOLOGY 
Measuring takeover activities performance has been an onerous problem confronting 
researchers. Two major methodologies are used to evaluate the performance: 
accounting-based or market-based methods (Delaney and Wameziri, 2004). Accounting 
based methods are subject to potential bias and tend to reflect the short-term 
performance of the firm over discrete time intervals (Kennedy and Limmack, 1996; 
Dodd and Officer, 1987). By contrast, market prices will reflect all available 
information according to the efficient market hypothesis. Furthermore, based on 
studying the movement of the companies’ share price, market-based methods could be a 
mirror of business performance and investor expectations (Stelter and Joiner, 2001). 
 
In this paper, the event study methodology is employed to measure the takeover 
activities’ performance in LPT sector at ASX. Since Fama et al. (1969) initially 
explored this field, the event study methodology has been used as one of the clearest 
and most reliable tests of market efficiency by researchers (Peirson et al, 2000). In 
short, the event study is a research method that analyses the behaviour of a security’s 
price around the time of a significant event such as the public announcement of the 
company’s profit. The event study methodology has also been widely used to examine 
security price behaviour around events such as accounting rule and money supply 
announcements. The event study methodology has, in fact, become the standard method 
of measuring security price reactions to announcements or events. In practice, event 
studies have been used for two major reasons: to test the null hypothesis and to examine 
the impact of some event on the wealth of the firm’s security holders (Binder, 1998).  
  
To employ the event study, three key conceptions should be addressed initially, that are 
used to measure the degree of sensitivity of stock prices to different events, viz. 
announcement day, event window and estimation period. In this paper, an 
announcement day is established for each takeover activity transaction. The 
announcement day is the first day that news of a merger proposal is released in ASX on 
a trading day. If the announcement appeared on a non-trading day, or after 1:00 P.M., 
the first trading day following the announcement is used. Designating the announcement 
day as day 0, market response is then measured by recording daily volume or daily 
shareholder return over a number of days surrounding the event day, referred to as the 
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event window. Thus the 41-day-window includes days -20, -19, -18…-1, 0, +1, +2, 
+3… +20. The 21-day-window and the 11-day-window are similarly defined. The 
reason why 41-day-window is set in this study is that in Australia, bidders may start 
building up their stakes well before the announcement of their bids. In order to examine 
the expected return, we implement the concept of estimate period which is taken as 
starting 240 working days (approximately 1 trading year) and finishing 21 days prior to 
the announcement. 
 
According to Brown and Warner (1985), abnormal returns are identified as the per cent 
change in share price in excess of (or below) the per cent change that would normally be 
expected. They are calculated using the following equation: 
 
                                 Ait = Rit –E (Rit)                                                        (1) 
 
where Ait is the abnormal return for firm i at day t, Rit is the stocks realised return for 
firm i at day t and E (Rit) is its expected return in the absence of a takeover activity. In 
calculating the return of security i, natural logarithm is employed, namely Rit = ℓn (Pt) – 
ℓn (Pt-1), where Pt is the close share price of firm i at day t at ASX. To calculate the E 
(Rit), there are two different methods: 
 
The first method is mean adjusted abnormal return: 
 
E (Rit) = ∑−
−=
=
21
240220
1
t
iti RR                                                                   (2) 
 
where iR is the simple average of security i observed daily returns in the estimation 
period. The estimation period in the analysis starts at day -240 and ends at day -21 
around its respective announcement day, which is defined as day 0. 
 
The second one is market adjusted abnormal return: 
 
                                              E (Rit) = Rmt                                                                                     (3) 
 
where Rmt is the market return measured as the first difference of the natural logarithm 
of the market index (Draper and Paudyal, 1999). The market index is taken for each 
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firm’s respective property sector from Standard & Poor and ASX index. This second 
procedure allows a comparison of the observed returns of the target or bidder firms to 
that of LPTs in general, during the period of announcement. This market index provides 
a yardstick in which LPTs can measure their performance. 
 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are also calculated using a process of summing 
the abnormal returns over different time series studies (Becher, 2000): 
 
CARit = CARit-1 +ARit                                                                             (4) 
 
where t and n is set by the different event windows. 
 
The trading volume also is employed to measure the response of the market by takeover 
activities. Trading volume is standardized for each firm by dividing its trading volume 
for the day by its normal trading volume. Thus standardized volume of 1.0 would reflect 
normal volume while standardized volume of 3.0 would indicate trading volume three 
times as great as normal. Normal volume is defined as the median daily volume for the 
four-week period beginning six weeks and ending two weeks before the beginning of 
the announcement week as reflecting the normal level without the influence from the 
event (Campbell et al, 1998). Standardized volume for the portfolios of firms studied on 
a given day is an unweighted average of the results for the firms include. 
 
EMPIRICAL STUDY  
In the LPT sector at ASX, there were fourteen transactions from 1998 to 2004 , 
involving 31 listed companies (Appendix 1). The results are examined for abnormal 
returns both from target firms and bidder firms, including accumulative abnormal 
returns and trading volumes. The data, basically opening, high, low and closing price of 
the shares, as well as the volume, were obtained from Speculative Trading Idea (2005). 
According to the ASX historical announcement, formal takeover activities are 
confirmed (ASX, 2005). Also, the All Ordinaries Index, obtained from the Standard & 
Poor official web site, is used to calculate the market adjusted abnormal returns.  
 
Abnormal Returns 
The reaction of the share price of target firms to the announcement of takeover bids has 
been extensively investigated. The evidence suggests that, in general, shareholders of 
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target firms become wealthier from merger and acquisition activities while shareholders 
of bidders suffer a loss from the transactions. 
 
Consistent with the evidence documented in the literature, our result provide evidence 
of pre-announcement abnormal returns while the largest one day abnormal (both 
measures) available to the shareholders of target companies occurs on the day of the 
announcement. As shown in Table 1, both mean and market abnormal returns are 
calculated. Examining the mean adjusted model, it displays no significant increases or 
decreases in the twenty days to the announcement day. However, on the day of the 
announcement, there is a noticeable increase in returns, the highest return during the 
examined period, with a value of 3.25 per cent for the mean adjusted model and 2.91 for 
the market model. The average abnormal returns from the mean model reflect the 
average share price. The market model allows comparison of the target firms share price 
with those of their competitors in the sector. The table reveals similar findings for both 
models. The abnormal returns to shareholders post-the announcement date are minimal 
in all four columns of table 1. Abnormal returns after the announcement are very small 
and unlikely to allow the development of a profitable trading strategy that covers 
transaction cost.  
 
From the Table 1, no variations in real abnormal returns could be detected for the 
bidders during the event window. In contrast to the experience of target firms the 
abnormal return is negative and very small” -0.59 per cent in the mean adjusted model 
and -0.18 per cent in the market model. Compared with the target firms, there is no any 
noticeable increase or decrease on the announcement day. During the examined period, 
the shareholders of bidders suffered the loss on 33 days of 41. 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
In Table 1, cumulative returns are provided over four different windows to show what 
period produces the highest as well as the lowest abnormal returns. The cumulative 
abnormal returns show a gain for the targets but not for the bidders. In contrast to the 
results of other studies, bidder firms gain no cumulative abnormal returns but rather a 
slight loss with the top of 0.69 per cent in the 21-day-window. Target firms, on the other 
hand, achieve some comparatively significant cumulative abnormal returns and obtain 
the major gains five days before, on and five days after the announcement. It is the 
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longer period surrounding the announcement that seems to give the greater returns with 
the highest value of 9.14 per cent in the 41-day-window. Delaney and Wamuziri (2004) 
gave the possible reason that the realization of the expected benefit might only appear as 
the details of the mergers are released over time. Figure 1 portrays the cumulative 
abnormal returns of both target firms and bidder firms. The significant impact of the bid 
announcements on the share prices of target firms is apparent. 
Targets Bidders 
Event window 
 Mean returns Market returns Mean returns Market returns 
-20 -0.29 -0.23 0.57 0.74 
-15 0.41 0.29 0.42 0.21 
-10 0.10 0.05 -0.24 -0.25 
-5 -0.61 -0.21 -0.48 -0.21 
-4 0.23 0.45 -0.29 0.13 
-3 0.77 0.43 0.54 0.22 
-2 1.75 2.44 0.08 0.74 
-1 0.41 0.27 0.38 0.18 
  0 3.25 2.91 0.59 0.18 
+1 2.66 2.81 -0.03 0.10 
+2 0.45 0.36 -0.60 -0.65 
+3 -0.45 -0.80 -0.42 -0.66 
+4 -0.17 -0.28 -0.32 -0.30 
+5 0.40 0.30 0.12 0.02 
+10 0.43 0.48 0.37 0.54 
+15 -0.22 -0.01 -0.11 0.12 
+20 0.03 0.11 -0.44 -0.41 
 CAR CAR CAR CAR 
-20 to +20 9.14 7.20 0.29 -0.98 
-15 to +15 9.27 8.10 -0.05 -0.55 
-10 to +10 9.04 8.06 -0.03 -0.69 
-  5 to + 5 8.69 8.68 -0.43 -0.27 
Table 1. Abnormal returns and CARs in different windows of target and bidder firms   
Trading Volume 
According to Campbell et al (1998), trading volume could reflect two main things in the 
stock market, valid expression of shareholder opinion and efficiency of the market in  
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Figure 1.  Cumulative abnormal return of target and bidder firms in the mean method 
 
Day -1 Day 0 Day +1  
Transactions 
 Bidders Targets Bidders Targets Bidders Targets 
T1 2.7 1.3 1.4 438.2 3.5 1.8 
T2 1.3 0.2 1.6 0.1 1.1 2.0 
T3 0.2 1.8 2.0 4.9 5.5 4.2 
T4 0.9 1.8 2.8 0.1 2.5 8.1 
T5 1.2 4.9 2.3 0.7 3.8 7.4 
T6 2.0 1.0 0.7 5.5 0.8 3.9 
3.9 2.5 1.6 
0.6 1.4 2.5 T7* 
0.3 
1.8 
1.2 
3.4 
0.8 
1.8 
T8 0.8 0.8 1.3 4.6 3.5 2.9 
T9 3.3 1.0 5.4 31.7 1.1 4.7 
1.4 0.7 1.2 
T10* 
0.5 
0.7 
0.4 
2.6 
2.5 
2.0 
T11 5.2 3.2 8.1 4.4 5.8 3.8 
T12 2.0 0.8 0.7 11.3 0.8 5.8 
T13 1.8 0.8 0.0 0.0 41.6 29.0 
T14 0.3 2.6 0.6 0.3 2.1 9.7 
Trading Volume 1.8 1.6 2.3 36.3 4.7 6.2 
Table 2. Trading volume of targets and bidders in a three-day-window 
Notes: T7*: There were three bidders and one target involved in this transaction. 
T10*: There were two bidders and one target involved in this transaction. 
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monitoring events and rapidly incorporating available information into the stock price. 
Table 2 reports the equally weighted average standardized trading volume for the 
portfolio of firms over a three-day-window. Results for bidder and target firms are 
reported separately. A strong first announcement day responce is observed. The bidder 
firms experienced trading volume 2.3 times normal, while volume of target firms surged 
to 36.3 times normal. The extremely strong response from shareholders of target firms 
is expected as shown in Figure 2. Campbell et al (1998) explain that it has a special 
meaning for target shareholders that their firms will disappear into a new entity but for 
bidder shareholders just a new capital acquisition instead.   
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Figure 2. Trading volume of targets and bidders in 20-day-window 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the context of a worldwide takeover boom during the 1990s, the authors find that in 
the LPTs sector in Australia, (ASX listed) takeover activities continus to benefit the 
shareholders of target firms’ but not the bidders’. First, shareholders in target firms 
obtain abnormal returns from takeover activities with the highest return of 3.25 per cent 
using the mean adjusted method. Second, from the point of cumulative abnormal 
returns, shareholders from target firms achieve a significant rise in abnormal returns 
around the announcement date but shareholders from bidder firms do not. Third, there 
appears a very active response in trading volume during the announcement date in 
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turnover values of target firms of up to 438.2 times standardized trading volume, which 
means high confidence from the share-traders. 
 
It is consistent with the findings from many publications that takeover activities do pay. 
Despite the takeover boom, the CAR returns of 9.53 per cent to target shareholders 
found in this research are not as high as the returns found in previous studies.  
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APPENDIX 1.   The list of takeover transactions from 1998 to 2004 
Transactions Bidders Targets Announcement 
Day 
T1 Grand Hotel Group Australian Tourism 
Group 
08/01/1998 
T2 Property Income 
Investment Trust 
Celsius House Trust 27/10/1998 
T3 Australand Property Group Walker Corporation 
Limited 
25/10/1999 
T4 Meridian Investment Trust Tyndall Property Trust 22/02/2000 
T5 Stockland Trust Group Flinders Industrial 
Property Trust 
10/05/2000 
T6 Stockland Trust Group Advance Property 
Fund 
01/09/2000 
T7 Prime Retail Group,  
Tyndall Meridian,  
Trust Centro Properties 
Group 
CT Retail Investment 
Trust 
10/05/2001 
T 8 Stockland Trust Group Australian 
Commercial Property 
Trust 
18/06/2001 
T9 GPT Group Homemaker Retail 
Management Limited 
19/09/2001 
T10 Gandel Retail Trust, 
Commonwealth Property 
Office Fund 
Colonial First State 
Property Trust Group 
30/07/2002 
T11 Investa Property Group Principal Office Fund 26/05/2003 
T12 Stockland Trust Group AMP Diversified 
Property Trust 
28/05/2003 
T13 Macquarie Group Principal America 
Office Trust 
28/07/2004 
T14 Mirvac Group James Fielding Group 12/10/2004 
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